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EXCEPTION PERCEPTION: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S STRICT VIEW
OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT
SAMANTHA PERUTO*
“[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship. . . .
[A] principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Daniel, a young boy from the suburbs of Philadelphia, struggled to
keep up with his classmates in school.2 Daniel exhibited issues with reading and demonstrated problems socializing with the other students.3 His
troubles began in kindergarten, which he attended for two years, and continued to third grade when Daniel was finally diagnosed with Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and offered appropriate accommodations by the school district.4
Thankfully, Congress has developed a statutory scheme whereby
struggling students like Daniel will receive the proper services and education from an early age.5 When services are denied, students may seek equitable remedies, such as compensatory education, to help them attain the
* J.D./M.B.A. Candidate, 2014, Villanova University School of Law; B.S. 2011
Saint Joseph’s University. This Article is dedicated to the memory of my
grandmother, Beatrice F. Nicoletti, a devoted teacher both inside and outside of
the classroom. I would also like to thank: my parents for their endless love,
support, and involvement in my education; my brothers, John and Vince, for their
humor, encouragement, and friendship; and the editors of the Villanova Law
Review for selecting this Article for publication and for their generous guidance
and commitment to excellence.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right, which must be made available to all on equal
terms.”), supplemented by 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see also Perry A. Zirkel, Does Brown v.
Board of Education Play a Prominent Role in Special Education Law?, 34 J.L. & EDUC.
255, 270 (2005) (noting that Brown represents “sea of change in the legal approach
to students that based on group characteristics faced separation or exclusion”).
2. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 240–42 (3d Cir. 2012) (summarizing facts of student’s struggle through school).
3. See id. (discussing academic and behavioral issues).
4. See id. at 242 (discussing diagnosis and eligibility for specialized services).
5. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006).
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same level of education as their classmates.6 Unfortunately for Daniel and
millions of other students, those remedies are unavailable when their parents fail to act within the statute’s two-year limitations period.7
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) serves to accommodate and protect the rights of disabled children by requiring public educational institutions to “identify and effectively educate” children
with special needs.8 To benefit from the IDEA, children must rely on parents and teachers to recognize their needs and advocate for their best interests.9 Unfortunately, neither parents nor teachers can adequately
advocate in isolation.10 Rather, it “takes a village”—a collaboration between teachers capable of identifying disabled children (Child Find) and
providing the free appropriate public education (FAPE) to those in need
of specialized services, and parents willing and able to raise a flag when
educational institutions fall short.11
6. See id. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (requiring judges to award “such relief as the
court determines is appropriate”); infra notes 151–57 and accompanying text (discussing compensatory education remedy).
7. See, e.g., infra notes 55–67 (discussing litigation surrounding this issue and
how courts apply the statute of limitations).
8. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (listing purposes of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); id. § 1401(3) (amended 2010) (defining “child with a disability” as
“(i) with intellectual disabilities, [hearing, speech, language, or visual] impairments, serious emotional disturbance . . . , orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and
(ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services”); D.K. v.
Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting effective education
may require schooling outside public school systems’ and school districts’ duty to
pay for child’s education elsewhere if institution is unable to provide specialized
services (citing P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727,
735 (3d Cir. 2009))); Elisa Hyman, Dean Hill Rivkin & Stephen A. Rosenbaum,
How IDEA Fails Families Without Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of
Special Education Lawyering, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 116 (2011)
(acknowledging IDEA protection is available to all disabled students, including students in public and private schools, and those who are “homeless, or in a hospital,
jail, prison, or foster care placement”).
9. See Erin Phillips, Note, When Parents Aren’t Enough: External Advocacy in Special Education, 117 YALE L.J. 1802, 1806 (2008) (noting children lack capacity to
identify disabilities or understand how their needs differ from other students).
The structure of IDEA forces children to rely on “their parents’ willingness and
ability to advocate for them.” Id.
10. See Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 647 (2002) (discussing
relative expertise of parents and educational institutions and need for team approach to maximize child’s welfare).
11. See Judith Wilson, A Conversation with Toni Morrison, ESSENCE, July 1981, at
84 (statement by Toni Morrison) (“I don’t think one parent can raise a child. I
don’t think two parents can raise a child. You really need the whole village.”); cf.
Phillips, supra note 9, at 1823–37 (discussing challenges and responsibilities facing
both parents and educators in providing most effective education to disabled students). Child Find is the school district’s obligation to identify, locate, and evaluate children in need of special education services. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3).
This obligation is “an affirmative one,” and the IDEA does not require parents to
request an evaluation of their child. See Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia,
401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“School districts may not ignore disabled stu-
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Under the IDEA’s current statutory scheme, parents have a short, twoyear period to request a due process hearing for any alleged IDEA violations.12 However, the limitations period will not apply under two exceptions: first, if the parents were unable to request the hearing due to
specific misrepresentations made to the parents by the local educational
agency (LEA) in regard to resolution of their child’s disability; and second, if the LEA withheld information from the parents of the disabled
child.13 Unfortunately, several courts have been reluctant to apply these
exceptions.14
In D.K. v. Abington School District,15 the Third Circuit delineated the
scope of the exceptions to the IDEA’s statute of limitations for the first
time.16 When D.K.’s parents requested a due process hearing and alleged
violations of the IDEA for the school district’s failure to diagnose their
child, they were unfortunately confronted with the IDEA’s statute of limitations, which excluded the parents from claiming any conduct by the
LEA that occurred more than two years prior to the hearing request.17
Consequently, D.K.’s claim was barred because the school district’s conduct that formed the basis for D.K.’s complaint fell beyond the two-year
dents’ needs, nor may they await parental demands before providing special instruction.”); accord Hyman et al., supra note 8, at 116 n.46 (same). The duty “is
triggered when [a school district] has reason to suspect a disability, and reason to
suspect that special education services may be needed to address that disability.”
Dep’t of Educ. v. Cari Rae S., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (D. Haw. 2001). The
“Child Find” provision includes “[c]hildren who are suspected of being a child with
a disability . . . and in need of special education, even though they are advancing
from grade to grade.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.125(a)(2)(ii) (2000); see Hyman et al., supra
note 8, at 116 n.47 (discussing examples of children exhibiting signs of disabilities,
which trigger Child Find obligations).
12. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C),(D) (outlining timeline for requesting hearing and exceptions); id. § 1415(b)(6) (noting parents may request impartial due
process hearing to resolve any issues “relating to the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of the child”); Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City
Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525 (2007) (noting issues addressed in complaint resolved
by hearing officer during due process hearing); accord 22 PA. CODE § 14.162(b)
(West, Westlaw through Mar. 2, 2013).
13. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D) (stating exceptions to timeline).
14. See infra notes 55–67 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
courts interpret and apply the statute of limitations exceptions.
15. 696 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2012).
16. See generally id. (recognizing difficulties faced by district courts applying
exceptions to IDEA claims); see also Jim Gerl, Big Decision: Statute of Limitations,
SPECIAL EDUC. L. BLOG (Nov. 6, 2012, 10:05 AM), http://specialeducationlawblog.
blogspot.com/2012/11/big-decision-statute-of-limitations.html (noting Third Circuit is first circuit to address IDEA statute of limitations); Third Circuit First to Examine Scope of Two-Year Statute of Limitations in Section 504 Claims, MAIELLO BRUNGO
& MAIELLO, LLP, http://www.mbm-law.net/newsletter-articles/third-circuit-first-toexamine-scope-of-two-year-statute-of-limitations-in-section-504-claims/2562/ (last
visited Feb. 15, 2013) (noting Third Circuit also first to examine statute of limitations as applied to Section 504 claims under Rehabilitation Act).
17. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (allowing only two years to file request for due
process hearing).
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period reviewable by the court, and no exceptions applied to rescue the
claim.18
The Third Circuit held that in order to toll the statute of limitations
under the first exception, the school district must have knowingly and intentionally misrepresented information to the parents.19 Alternatively,
under the second exception, the LEA must have withheld statutorily required information from the parents.20 For either exception to apply, the
LEA’s conduct must have caused the parents’ failure to request a due process hearing within the two-year statute of limitations period.21 The court
also rejected any application of equitable tolling doctrines to the IDEA.22
While giving better guidance on application of the exceptions, the
Third Circuit’s holding is a stringent test, and limits parents’ ability to
overcome the statute of limitations.23 The implications are far-reaching,
as many families are unaware of IDEA violations until it is too late, making
the remedies under the IDEA practically ineffective.24 This decision
places an even higher burden upon parents of disabled children to become more involved, informed, and aware, and to raise and resolve IDEA
issues in a timely manner.25
This article examines how the Third Circuit’s decision will impact future litigation of IDEA claims, outlines how parents may successfully navigate the statute’s exceptions to toll the limitations period, and advocates
for a broader interpretation of the exceptions in the future.26 Part II examines the history of special education in the United States and the devel18. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 240–42 (summarizing facts showing teachers allowed
D.K. to continue through school despite difficulties); id. at 245–48 (holding no
exception to statute of limitations applied).
19. For the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the first exception, see infra
notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
20. For the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the second exception, see infra
notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
21. For the Third Circuit’s analysis of causation under the statute, see infra
notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
22. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 248 (providing further discussion of courts’ rejection
of equitable tolling under IDEA).
23. For a discussion of how the Third Circuit’s decision will impact future
litigation of IDEA claims for plaintiffs, see infra notes 111–29, 138–47 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 138–47 and accompanying text (discussing impact of decision on parental burdens under IDEA).
25. See generally Phillips, supra note 9 (arguing parents of disabled children
need assistance to achieve optimal outcomes for their children due to complexities
of IDEA system and child’s disabilities); see also infra notes 138–47 and accompanying text (same).
26. For an analysis of the decision’s impact on future litigation, see infra notes
111–29 and accompanying text; see also Lynn M. Daggett, Perry A. Zirkel & LeeAnn
L. Gurysh, For Whom the School Bell Tolls but Not the Statute of Limitations: Minors and
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 717, 723
(2005) (defining tolling as “the suspension or interruption of the statute of limitations—in other words, temporarily putting the statute of limitations clock on
hold”).
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opment of the IDEA.27 Further, Part II addresses how other courts have
interpreted the IDEA’s statute of limitations and its exceptions.28 Part III
explains the Third Circuit’s decision in D.K. v. Abington School District in
greater detail and examines the rationale behind the ruling.29 Finally,
Part IV critically analyzes the decision and provides guidance to practitioners, highlights policy issues on both sides of the dispute, and assesses the
strengthened role of parents.30
II. BACKGROUND
While this article examines a limitation on the IDEA, it is important
to first understand the history of special education in the United States.31
Prior to the IDEA—a relatively new piece of legislation—students with special needs were inadequately represented in the political process.32 This
section highlights the major changes in special education protection
throughout the twentieth century, which eventually led to the enactment
of the IDEA.33 Further, this section explores the general principles of the
IDEA, the role of parents in a child’s education, and the statute of
limitations.34
A.

The Evolution of Special Education in the United States35

Education plays a vital role in the development of society and shaping
the future of the United States.36 Despite its importance, special educa27. For further discussion of the development of the IDEA and special education law in the United States, see infra notes 37–49 and accompanying text.
28. For an overview of the statute of limitations under the IDEA and interpretations thereof, see infra notes 50–67 and accompanying text.
29. For further discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis in D.K. v. Abington
School District, see infra notes 68–106 and accompanying text.
30. For an in-depth discussion of the practical implications of D.K. v. Abington
School District for practitioners, students, and parents, see infra notes 107–47 and
accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 35–41 discussing developments in special education legislation in the United States.
32. See infra note 37 and accompanying text for a discussion of inadequate
special education law in the twentieth century.
33. See infra notes 38–41 and accompanying text for brief highlights of legislative milestones leading to the IDEA.
34. See infra notes 42–67 and accompanying text for a detailed description of
relevant IDEA provisions.
35. See Phillips, supra note 9, at 1809–13 (discussing developments leading to
IDEA’s enactment).
36. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (discussing importance of education in citizenship, culture, and living productive adult life); Phillips, supra note 9, at 1812–13 (discussing Brown decision’s effect on changes in
educational system in second half of twentieth century); Thomas A. Mayes, Perry
A. Zirkel & Dixie Snow Huefner, Allocating the Burden of Proof in Administrative and
Judicial Proceedings Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 108 W. VA. L.
REV. 27, 36 (2005) (regarding IDEA as “the disability movement’s Brown v. Board of
Education”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tion was largely underrepresented in the political arena until the 1970s
and the rise of the disability rights movement.37 A major milestone for
special education and disabilities advocates was Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which disallowed any federally funded program from
discriminating on the basis of disability.38
Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) of 1975, subsequently renamed in 1990 as
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).39 The IDEA was
the result of a congressional finding that an exorbitant number of disabled children were inadequately educated, including millions who were
37. See Phillips, supra note 9, at 1809 (discussing public’s lack of concern with
special education until advocates fought to promote rights of disabled individuals).
The 1970s was a decade of progress for special education advocates, especially in
the classroom. See id. at 1809–12 (summarizing evolution of special education accommodation in 1970s). The movement sought to shift the public’s conceptions
of disabilities away from a medical perspective and towards a focus on using “existing social arrangements” to help rather than handicap disabled individuals. See
id. at 1809 n.18 (citing RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS:
TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY 169–70, 178–79 (2d ed. 2001) (describing disability rights movement’s goals and successes)). “[D]isability policy [prior
to 1970] adhered to the medical model of disability ‘in which people with disabilities were presumed unable to function independently in the mainstream of social,
economic, and political life.’ ” Id. at 1809 (citation omitted). Two federal court
decisions reiterated that children with disabilities have equal rights to public education as other children. See Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C.
1972) (declaring that financial hardship could not justify denying services to disabled children who are entitled to public education); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
(“[M]entally retarded persons are capable of benefiting from a program of education and training.”). The PARC and Mills decisions also gave parents of disabled
children an opportunity to participate for the first time in the decision-making
process in their child’s education. See Phillips, supra note 9, at 1813 (discussing
effect of PARC and Mills on legislation and parents’ rights, which Congress previously neglected). For further discussion of parental roles in children’s education
under IDEA, see infra notes 45–49 and accompanying text.
38. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000)) (“No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.”). Section 504 prompted
a strong societal push towards accommodation of disabled individuals, specifically,
students in public school systems. See Phillips, supra note 9, at 1810 (noting regulations framed Section 504 as “declaration of civil rights for disabled people”). Despite its success, members of Congress did not anticipate any extraordinary results
from Section 504. See SCOTCH, supra note 37, at 54.
39. See Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-476, § 901, 104 Stat. 1103, 1141–42 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400)
(renaming EAHCA as Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); Phillips, supra
note 9, at 1813 (confirming basic substantive law of EAHCA remained in IDEA
after changing name). As of 2012, the IDEA served almost 6.5 million students
with disabilities by providing specialized education services. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Data, DATA ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER, www.ideadata.org
(last visited Feb. 16, 2013) (analyzing IDEA statistics).
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“excluded entirely” from public school systems.40 Finally, Congress recognized a disabled child’s right to special education, a step beyond Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.41
B.
1.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

Principles and Policies

The IDEA is a federal special education statute that offers funding to
state educational agencies (SEAs) that commit to adopt the necessary policies and procedures to comply with the IDEA’s twenty-five listed conditions.42 In states receiving IDEA funding, schools must identify children
requiring special education services (Child Find) and provide a FAPE to
those students.43 The FAPE must be tailored to the particular needs of
the child through an individual educational program (IEP).44
The IDEA places a strong emphasis on the role of parents in a child’s
education.45 Prior to the IDEA, Congress recognized that schools, acting
40. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2006) (listing reasons why educational needs
of disabled children were not met prior to enactment); Mayes et al., supra note 36,
at 36 (noting number of children excluded from adequate education was
“intolerable”).
41. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (stating purpose of IDEA is to affirmatively “ensure . . . the rights of children with disabilities”), with 29 U.S.C. § 794 (forbidding
exclusion on basis of disability for all federally funded programs, not solely educational institutions). See generally Perry A. Zirkel, A Comprehensive Comparison of the
IDEA and Section 504/ADA, 282 EDUC. L. REP. 767 (2012) (comparing IDEA with
Section 504 and Americans with Disabilities Act).
42. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (listing twenty-five conditions); Mayes et al., supra
note 36, at 36–37 (noting conditions are intended to ensure disabled children in
every IDEA funded state receive FAPE and describing how funds are allocated
amongst state and local educational agencies).
43. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2012) (describing IDEA obligations). “The IDEA protects the rights of disabled children by mandating that public educational institutions identify and effectively educate those
children, or pay for their education elsewhere if they require specialized services
that the public institution cannot provide.” P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester
Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 735 (3d Cir. 2009). See generally Thomas A. Mayes &
Perry A. Zirkel, State Educational Agencies and Special Education, Obligations and Liabilities, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 62 (2000) (describing obligations of IDEA funded
states).
44. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A) (2006) (requiring IEP for students deemed
eligible for special education services); 150 CONG. REC. E2103–02 (daily ed. Nov.
19, 2004) (statement of Rep. Michael M. Honda) (“Every child learns at his own
pace and our educational system must be able to accommodate the needs of each
individual student.”). The IEP need only be “reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits.” Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
206–07 (1982). The IEP is distinct from the FAPE in that an IEP is an offering of
FAPE. See I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 762, 771
(M.D. Pa. 2012) (describing differences between FAPE and IEP to resolve FAPE
obligation issue in cyber charter schools).
45. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B) (acknowledging parents’ rights also
protected under IDEA); id. §§ 1414(a)(1)–(2), 1415(a)–(c) (parent involvement
in IDEA eligibility determinations); id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I) (parental consent to
provision of and placement in special education); id. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (parent in-
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alone, frequently fail to satisfactorily treat disabled students.46 Further,
Congress found that incorporating parents in the educational process
yields positive results.47 Thus, Congress believed a central parental role
would ensure the effectiveness of the IDEA and each student’s educational
program.48 As a result, the IDEA provides for parent involvement in procedures including, but not limited to, IDEA eligibility determinations and
requires parental consent to the provision of and placement in special
education programs.49
volvement on IEP teams); id. § 1415(b)(1) (parents’ right to examine all records
related to child and participate in all IDEA meetings); id. § 1415(b)(2)(A) (assigning surrogate parents when parents unknown); id. § 1415(k) (providing for
parent involvement in discipline decisions).
46. See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 873–76 (D.D.C. 1972)
(requiring equality of access to education and preference for mainstream education after parents challenged statute that excluded mentally disabled children
from education and training in public schools); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children
(PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 302–03 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (same); cf.
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309–12 (1988) (discussing Congress’s need to highlight parental participation in education because schools typically fail to consult
parents concerning child’s education). For further discussion of Congress’s findings regarding inadequate education of disabled children, see supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
47. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5) (2000) (“Over 20 years of research and experience has demonstrated that the education of children with disabilities can be
made more effective by . . . strengthening the role of parents and ensuring that
families of such children have meaningful opportunities to participate in the education of their children at school and at home . . . .”); cf. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)
(2006) (adding to 2000 version of statute that “strengthening the role and responsibility of parents” increases effectiveness of education of children with disabilities)
(emphasis added).
48. See Daggett et al., supra note 26, at 728 (“Congress’s purpose in creating
the IDEA parent role and rights was utilitarian. . . . [And] essential to the success
of the student’s education program.”); Martin A. Kotler, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A Parent’s Perspective and Proposal for Change, 27 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 331, 362 (1994) (“[T]he history of the Act makes it apparent that policymakers viewed parental involvement in decisions affecting the child as the primary
means by which earlier abuses were to be corrected.”). For further discussion and
analysis of all IDEA provisions concerning parents, see Daggett et al., supra note 26,
at 728–35.
The high burden on parents under the IDEA is justified because their “strong
emotional attachment to their children and considerable knowledge of their particular needs make parents the child-specific experts most qualified to assess and
pursue their children’s best interests in most circumstances.” Buss, supra note 10,
at 647. Therefore, control over the education of children traditionally remains
within the family. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that
Amish parents need not comply with compulsory education laws). But see Buss,
supra, note 10, at 647 (arguing that law should not give absolute deference to parents because state interests in educating children and promoting social welfare
sometimes justify interference with traditional parental authority).
49. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)–(c) (2006) (noting parental involvement in IDEA
eligibility determinations); id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I) (providing for parental consent to placement in special education programs). For more examples of parental
involvement under the IDEA, see supra note 45.
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The Statute of Limitations and its Exceptions

In 2004, Congress amended the IDEA to include, among other provisions, a statute of limitations.50 The IDEA indicates that parents should
request the impartial due process hearing “within 2 years of the date the
parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that
forms the basis of the complaint.”51 This addition reflects Congress’s desire for prompt filing and resolution of IDEA claims and a uniform statute
of limitations across all states.52
50. See Daggett et al., supra note 26, at 766 (discussing all 2004 amendments).
Prior to 2004, the IDEA did not specify the time limits for filing for due process
hearings. See id. at 748 (noting lack of textual time limits in pre-2004 IDEA). Absent federal guidance, most courts borrowed from analogous state statutes of limitations. See id. (noting states could also borrow from analogous federal statutes of
limitations or use equitable principles, but few courts exercised these options).
Courts adopting analogous state statutes generally adopted the torts statutes of
limitations, which are typically two or three years. See id. at 748 n.180 (noting,
however, that tort statutes of limitations are not obviously analogous to IDEA
claims, especially given vast differences in parental roles under IDEA); see generally
Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Statutes of Limitations for Filing Lawsuits Under the IDEA: A State
by State Analysis, 191 EDUC. L. REP. 545 (2004) (discussing each state’s statute of
limitations period prior to IDEA 2004). However, under the 2004 amendments,
the IDEA still permits states to adopt the state statute of limitations. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f)(3)(C) (2006) (allowing two year timeline to request due process hearings, “or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for requesting such a hearing
under this subchapter, in such time as the State law allows.”); S.H. ex rel. A.H. v.
Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 487 F. App’x 850, 862–64 (5th Cir. 2012) (adopting Texas
statute of limitations, but same exceptions and other substantive IDEA provisions
applied).
Congress enacted IDEA 2004 on December 3, 2004, but the statute specified
that only certain provisions would take effect on that date. See Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–446, 118 Stat.
2647 (noting all sections, except as otherwise stated, became effective in December
2004). Others, including the statute of limitations, took effect on July 1, 2005. See
id. (specifying sections becoming effective July 2005). Applying the statute of limitations retroactively to conduct occurring prior to July 2005 proved to be a confusing issue for many district courts, but is beyond the scope of this article. See Steven
I. v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 618 F.3d 411, 412 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010) (resolving in favor
of district). Compare Evan H. ex rel. Kosta H. v. Unionville Chadds Ford Sch. Dist.,
No. 07-4990, 2008 WL 4791634, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2008) (concluding IDEA
2004 statute of limitations applied retroactively to claims filed after July 1, 2005,
even if conduct occurred prior to that date), and D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., No.
08-4914, 2010 WL 1223596, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2010) (same), Breanne C. v. S.
York Cnty. Sch. Dist., 665 F. Supp. 2d 504, 511–12 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (same), Sch.
Dist. of Phila. v. Deborah A., No. 08-2924, 2009 WL 778321, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24,
2009) (same), with J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., No. 06-1652, 2009 WL
1119608, at *10 (W.D. Pa. April 27, 2009) (holding IDEA 2004 statute of limitations does not apply to claims filed after July 1, 2005 where conduct occurred prior
to that date), Laura P. v. Haverford Sch. Dist., No. 07-5395, 2008 WL 5000461, at
*12 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2008) (same), and Tereance D. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 570 F.
Supp. 2d 739, 745–49 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (same).
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(e) (2012) (emphasis added).
52. See Daggett et al., supra note 26, at 769 (discussing various theories of
congressional intent behind statute of limitations in IDEA 2004); id. at 749
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The 2004 amendments specify two exceptions that limit the applicability of the statute of limitations.53 The limitations period will not apply
when the parents of the disabled child are:
[P]revented from requesting the due process hearing due to—
(i) specific misrepresentations by the [LEA] that it had resolved the
problem forming the basis of the complaint; or
(ii) the [LEA]’s withholding of information from the parent that
was required under this subchapter to be provided to the parent.54
Courts have struggled to interpret these exceptions since their enactment, and many recognize that “statutory and regulatory guidance are
lacking.”55 Several courts have noted the statute’s preference to leave interpretation of “misrepresentations” to the “purview of the hearing officer.”56 Thus, plaintiffs bear a tough burden of proving that the

nn.182–83 (discussing various limitations periods among several states (citing
Perry Zirkel & Peter Maher, The Statute of Limitations Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 175 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 6–7 (2003))). Prior to the IDEA 2004,
state statutes of limitations for IDEA claims varied from sixty days to five years. See
id. at 749 n.182 (surveying court decisions and noting only North Carolina used
sixty-day limitations period compared to longer periods in Third Circuit). Thus,
the federal statute of limitations shortened the timeline for some jurisdictions. See
id. (noting many jurisdictions adopted three-year timeline).
Moreover, prompt filing leads to prompt resolution, which serves a primary
goal of the IDEA: to provide eligible students with FAPE as soon as possible. See id.
at 769 (discussing legislative intent). Some argue the short deadline forces parents
to become adversarial very quickly, which makes the educational process and parental role less effective. See Cory D. v. Burke Cnty. Sch. Dist., 285 F.3d 1294, 1299
n.4 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting court decisions finding short limitations periods inconsistent with congressional goals). These critics argue the short timeline dilutes
the “procedural rights’ effectiveness by denying parents sufficient time to consider
and evaluate an adverse decision by school authorities.” Id. However, Congress
clearly rejects this notion. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (imposing limitations period).
For further discussion of the policy justifications for statutes of limitations, see infra
notes 130–37 and accompanying text.
53. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D) (listing both exceptions).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 762, 775
(M.D. Pa. 2012); accord Evan H., 2008 WL 4791634, at *6.
56. 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,706 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R.
pts. 300–01). “We do not believe it is appropriate to define or clarify the meaning
of ‘misrepresentations’ . . . .” Id.; see, e.g., J.L. ex rel. J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch.
Dist., No. 06-1652, 2009 WL 1119608, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2009), abrogated on
other grounds by Steven I. v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 618 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 2010). The
Fifth Circuit noted that Congress properly left educational policies and procedures
in the hands of state and local officials. See S.H. ex rel. A.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch.
Dist., 487 F. App’x 850, 855 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing White v. Ascension Parish Sch.
Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir. 2003)). But see Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 252 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that federal district courts
review hearing record “virtually de novo,” despite limited role of circuit courts).
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exceptions are met, and courts must undertake a “highly factual inquiry”
to determine whether either exception applies.57
To toll the statute of limitations under the first exception, most courts
required an intentional, knowing misrepresentation, while others allow
mere negligence.58 Courts refuse to allow the action for which the IDEA
claim was brought to be a sufficient action to toll the statute of limitations
because “doing so would allow the exception to become the rule, and the
limitations period would be all but eliminated.”59 However, the Western
District of Pennsylvania allowed mere negligent misrepresentation to toll
the statute of limitations where the school district should have known of the
student’s disability.60
The second exception speaks only of statutorily required information,
which includes a procedural safeguards notification.61 The procedural
safeguards notice includes a full explanation of the parents’ rights under
57. J.L., 2009 WL 1119608, at *4. The parents bear the burden of proving
that the exceptions apply to the case. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005)
(placing burden of proof “properly . . . upon the party seeking relief”); Mayes et
al., supra note 36 (discussing various circuits’ leading cases on burdens of proof).
58. Compare Evan H., 2008 WL 4791634, at *6 (“[A]t the very least, a misrepresentation must be intentional in order to satisfy the first [exception]”), and I.H.,
842 F. Supp. 2d at 775 (same), with J.L., 2009 WL 1119608, at *11–12 (allowing
negligent misrepresentation to toll limitations period). In most courts, a misrepresentation must be more than a merely inadequate evaluation of a student. See I.H.,
842 F. Supp. 2d at 775. In I.H., the court held that a school district’s inadequate
evaluation of a student, resulting in a failure to accommodate the student’s disabilities, is not an intentional, or even negligent, misrepresentation. See id.
59. I.H., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 775 (indicating that without more, action forming
basis of claim itself was insufficient, but not indicating what additional information
was required); see Evan H., 2008 WL 4791634, at *6 n.3 (“Such an exception would
swallow the rule established by the limitation period.”).
60. See J.L., 2009 WL 1119608, at *11–12 (relying on Pennsylvania law allowing intentional, negligent, or innocent misrepresentation).
61. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(2) (2006) (requiring procedural safeguards notification to include full explanation of safeguards written in native language of parents and in easily understandable manner). The notification must contain an
explanation of the procedural safeguards available to parents relating to several
aspects of the child’s education, including “the opportunity to present and resolve
complaints . . . .” See id. (listing all available topics for procedural safeguards notice). The notice must also include the time period for parents to file complaints,
information regarding the agency’s ability to resolve the complaint, and available
mediation remedies. See id.
Further, the complaint must affirmatively allege the information was statutorily required for the court to apply the exception. See I.H., 842 F. Supp. 2d at
774–75 (refusing to apply second exception where plaintiffs alleged school’s failure to promptly evaluate child prevented guardians from understanding nature of
child’s disabilities, but did not indicate any statutorily required information was
withheld). The type of information contemplated under the second exception
does not include information that would have stemmed from an evaluation that
might affect how parents understand the nature of a disability. See id. (holding
information from evaluations insufficient to toll limitations period). Failing to
promptly evaluate the child is the IDEA violation itself, which cannot be the basis
for tolling the statute of limitations. See id.
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the IDEA relating to their child’s education, including a description of the
relevant timelines.62 Parents are entitled to this information in only three
circumstances: “(1) the student is referred for, or the parents request an
evaluation; (2) the parents file a complaint; or (3) the parents specifically
request the forms.”63
Finally, even if a school district misrepresented or withheld information, that conduct must have prevented the parents from requesting the
hearing (the “causation requirement”), further limiting application of the
exceptions.64 For example, consider a situation in which a school district
withholds the procedural safeguards notice from parents of a disabled student who are entitled to the information.65 Because the parents do not
have the procedural safeguards notification, they are unaware of their
right to request a due process hearing or file a complaint against the
school district and therefore do not request a hearing within the two-year
statutory timeline.66 Under these circumstances, the withholding of information prevented the parents from requesting the hearing within the limitations period and the statute of limitations would be tolled under the
second exception.67

62. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (listing required information); see also Kotler,
supra note 48, at 362 (arguing procedural safeguards ensure educators do not act
unilaterally unless informed parents relinquish responsibility). Compare Evan H.,
2008 WL 4791634, at *7 (holding plaintiffs allegations that school district withheld
information not statutorily required was insufficient to toll statute of limitations),
with S.H. ex rel. A.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 487 F. App’x 850, 862–64 (5th Cir.
2012) (holding failure to include required individuals in ARDC meeting constituted withholding of required information).
63. D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist. 696 F.3d 233, 247 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 20
U.S.C. § 1415(d)). Unfortunately, unless parents are entitled to this information
in one of the three circumstances, parents are uninformed about the availability of
specialized services for their child. See Evan H., 2008 WL 4791634, at *7 (“Section
1415(d) . . . states how and when a [procedural safeguards notice] must be made
available to parents and details what information such a notice must contain. It
does not refer to any of the substantive information, regarding specific services
available to a student and a particular student’s educational progress . . . .”).
64. See, e.g., S.H., 487 F. App’x at 862–63 (distinguishing cases where school
districts withheld information, but did not prevent parents from requesting
hearing).
65. See supra text accompanying note 62 (listing circumstances entitling parents to notification).
66. See, e.g., D.G. v. Somerset Hills Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 484, 492 (D.N.J.
2008) (applying second exception where parents requested evaluation and school
failed to provide procedural safeguards notice, thus denying parents of information about right to file complaint or request due process hearing).
67. See, e.g., S.H., 487 F. App’x at 862 (applying second exception where parents were unaware of IDEA procedures).
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III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S APPROACH
In D.K. v. Abington School District, the Third Circuit closely scrutinized
D.K.’s entire educational history in the district.68 Ultimately, the court
applied the same strict standard adopted by a majority of district courts.69
The following discussion shows how the Third Circuit used the facts
presented to conclude D.K.’s educational background did not justify any
exception to the IDEA’s statute of limitations.70
A.

Facts of D.K. v. Abington School District

In D.K. v. Abington School District, the plaintiffs, D.K.’s parents, appealed a district court decision, affirming the state agency’s decision that
the public school district did not violate the IDEA by failing to designate a
struggling student as disabled.71 The student, D.K., began kindergarten in
the fall of 2003.72 During his first year, D.K. exhibited difficulties in the
classroom, including both behavioral issues and reading problems.73 The
school district recommended that D.K. repeat kindergarten before moving on to first grade.74 At this time, the school district’s psychologist
noted that D.K.’s behavior was not uncommon amongst children his age,
and D.K.’s issues did “not necessarily indicate a disorder.”75
In D.K.’s second year, he made little progress with his behavioral issues, despite improved math and reading skills.76 To address these concerns, D.K.’s teachers did not conduct a functional behavioral assessment,
but rather implemented informal behavior plans in the classroom.77
68. See infra notes 70–95 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of
D.K.’s education in the school district.
69. See infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Third
Circuit’s standard.
70. See infra notes 99–106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
court’s application of the standard to D.K.’s educational background.
71. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 243 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting
district court’s opinion that “the [School] District had insufficient reason to believe that D.K. was a student with a mental impairment”) (alteration in original).
72. See id. at 240 (noting D.K. attended Copper Beech Elementary in Abington, Pennsylvania).
73. See id. (noting that two school district psychologists, Drs. Suzanne Grim
and Jan Kline, stated D.K. “failed to progress in . . . following oral directions, listening to and acknowledging the contributions of others, exhibiting self-control, following rules, producing neat and legible work, completing class work [on time],
and using non-instructional time appropriately”).
74. See id. (noting D.K. attended half-day kindergarten program in year one
and full day program in year two).
75. See id. (discussing findings of Dr. Suzanne Grim and school principal Dr.
Jan Kline).
76. See id. (noting D.K.’s difficulty controlling himself, as he experienced
forty-three tantrums in only two months and turned in rushed and incomplete
assignments).
77. See id. (noting behavior plans, including sticker chart and system using
popsicle sticks, yielded beneficial results as D.K. played well with classmates
throughout school year and performed well academically).
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D.K.’s parents were optimistic about the behavior plans, but by the end of
the year, both parents and teachers expressed major concerns about
D.K.’s ability to handle a first grade environment.78
Despite those concerns, D.K. advanced to first grade where his behavioral problems continued.79 D.K.’s teachers recommended measures that
D.K.’s parents could take at home to address these issues but did not discuss the possibility of a formal evaluation.80 A subsequent conference in
December 2005 revealed D.K. was still struggling with behavioral issues but
was not yet a candidate for formal testing because he was not failing
academically.81
D.K.’s parents requested an evaluation of D.K. in January 2006, the
results of which indicated D.K. was not in need of special education services.82 Though still struggling, D.K. continued to advance through the
school system.83 He continued to show progress academically, but his behavioral interactions with other students remained troublesome.84
78. See id. at 241 (noting concerns about advancing to first grade stemming
from little behavioral progress in second kindergarten year).
79. See id. (discussing parent-teacher conference held only two months after
beginning first grade where D.K.’s teacher informed his parents that he was copying work from other students, “was unable to recall instructions, exhibited poor
organizational and planning skills,” and other behavioral issues).
80. See id. (noting conference held in November 2005 for purpose of addressing D.K.’s behavioral weaknesses).
81. See id. (noting that D.K.’s teacher told parents that formal evaluation may
be option down the road). Due to his poor social skills, the school district placed
D.K. in a special social skills group. See id. The school’s psychologist, Dr. Grim,
claimed D.K. was “on par with” other students in the group. See id. The social
skills group, however, was not the result of a formal evaluation or diagnosis. See id.
(noting D.K. was not yet evaluated at this time, but parents requested evaluation
later that month).
82. See id. (noting school district did not evaluate D.K. until April 24, 2006).
The school district, through Dr. Grim, administered several tests including a cognitive ability test, a visual-motor integration test, a Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children Fourth Edition, and a Wechsler Individual Achievement Test Second Edition. See id. (describing testing). Dr. Grim also observed D.K. in his classroom and
used the Behavior Assessment System for Children (BASC) to assess whether D.K.
suffered from ADHD. See id. The tests revealed D.K. did not need special education services because his scores placed him in “average and low-average ranges.”
Id. At this time, the school did not provide a functional behavioral assessment
(FBA), which D.K.’s parents believed rendered the April 2006 evaluation inadequate. See id. at 249–51 (noting inadequate evaluation as one basis of parents’
claims of Child Find violations). However, the court found the testing legally adequate because the IDEA does not require an FBA under these circumstances. See
id. at 251. Moreover, the fact that subsequent testing reveals a disability does not
automatically render prior testing legally inadequate. See id. (noting IDEA and
regulations do not require FBA testing during initial testing for suspected
disabilities).
83. See id. at 241 (noting D.K. began second grade in fall of 2006 after his
parents approved results of April 2006 evaluation and signed Notice of Recommended Education Placement form).
84. See id. (noting D.K. fought with other children on playground and bus).
D.K.’s parents disagreed with the school district regarding D.K.’s progress in
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Around March 2007, Dr. Linn Cohen, a private therapist, notified the
school district and D.K.’s teachers that D.K. needed special educational
placement and should be formally retested.85 At the end of the school
year, D.K.’s father notified the school district that D.K. had been diagnosed with “auditory processing” and “sensory stimulation” problems.86
That summer, the parents requested a second formal evaluation, hoping
for a more comprehensive result.87
D.K. was finally diagnosed with ADHD in September 2007 by a private
pediatric neurological evaluation obtained by D.K.’s parents.88 In November 2007, the school district finally retested D.K. and found him eligible
for special education services.89 On November 30, 2007, the school district offered an IEP.90
Pursuant to the IDEA, D.K.’s parents requested a due process hearing
on January 8, 2008, challenging the school district’s conduct since D.K.
began school.91 The state agency hearing officer denied the claims and
the district court affirmed.92 The district court held that the statute of
school. See id. (describing both parties’ opinions on progress). His parents
claimed that the extra reading and math help D.K. received was insufficient and
that D.K. still struggled academically. See id. Conversely, the school district believed he made “considerable progress.” Id.
85. See id. (noting D.K. had been seeing Dr. Cohen since January). Dr. Cohen
“was ‘[e]xtremely convinced’ D.K. needed special placement.” Id. The school district discussed the results of their prior evaluation with Dr. Cohen, yet she still
recommended re-testing. See id.
86. See id. at 242 (describing parents’ actions at end of D.K.’s second grade
year).
87. See id. (noting D.K.’s parents requested evaluation before beginning of
third grade, but D.K. was not tested until November 2007 by school district).
88. See id. (describing diagnosis and findings). Dr. Peter Kollros diagnosed
D.K. in September 2007, two months after his parents requested the school’s evaluation, but still months before the school actually performed its own evaluation,
despite the request. See id. at 241–42 (describing timeline of events). Dr. Kollros
opined, “D.K.’s ‘learning would be enhanced if he were to have the [usual accommodations] for children with ADHD,” such as preferential seating, testing in distraction-free environments, and various other supports. Id. at 242. Still, D.K.
waited two more months for the school’s evaluation. See id.
89. See id. at 242 (noting school district classified D.K. as student with “other
health impairment”). See generally Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
Data, supra note 39 (analyzing statistics of disability classifications under IDEA and
other related statistics).
90. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 242 (noting that while district offered IEP in November, it would not be implemented until March 2008, almost four years after D.K.
began schooling).
91. See id. (noting requested award of compensatory education for September
2004 through March 2008, when D.K.’s IEP would be implemented); supra note 12
and accompanying text (describing parents’ right to due process hearing); infra
notes 151–57 and accompanying text (describing compensatory education
remedy).
92. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 242–43 (noting that appeals panel also affirmed hearing officer’s decision and found no abuse of discretion). Because the parents had
exhausted all administrative remedies, they sought review of the hearing officer
and appeals panel’s decisions in the district court. See id. at 242 (describing deci-
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limitations barred plaintiffs’ claims arising from conduct before January 8,
2006, two years before the due process hearing request, and neither exception to the statute of limitations applied.93
D.K.’s parents appealed to the Third Circuit, arguing that the exceptions to the statute of limitations should apply.94 The plaintiffs argued
under the first exception that the school district misrepresented D.K.’s
success by advising D.K.’s parents that D.K.’s issues could be resolved
through alternative means “short of special education placement” (i.e.,
the behavioral plans).95 Under the second exception, the parents argued
the school district’s failure to provide a permission to evaluate form and a
procedural safeguards notice until January 5, 2006 constituted a withholding of information sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.96

sions at administrative level). In cases arising under the IDEA, courts give “ ‘due
weight’ and deference to the findings in the administrative proceedings.” P.P. ex
rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 734 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982)). Giving “due weight”
requires a modified de novo review, which considers factual findings from administrative proceedings to be prima facie correct. See S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist.,
336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003).
93. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 242–43 (describing district court’s decision). The
district court agreed with the hearing officer that the school district did not violate
its obligations to identify students requiring special education (Child Find). See id.
The court reasoned that prior to D.K.’s second evaluation and ADHD diagnosis,
there was no sufficient reason to believe D.K. had a mental impairment because
children develop at different rates, and D.K.’s difficulties were not so pronounced
during his early school years. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., No. 08-4914, 2010 WL
1223596, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2010). Further, the court held the school district
did not fail to provide a FAPE before November 2007 because the school was not
required to conduct a functional behavioral assessment during the initial April
2006 evaluations. See id. at *8–9 (finding testing legally adequate). The court also
rejected the plaintiffs’ request to introduce additional evidence. See id. at *10–11.
94. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 244 (noting parents argued, alternatively, that equitable tolling doctrines should apply). The parents did not dispute that the statute of
limitations generally would limit their claims to conduct after January 8, 2006 because they requested the due process hearing on January 8, 2008. See id. They
merely argued the application of the exceptions and equitable tolling doctrines.
See id. (rejecting application of equitable tolling doctrines); accord Daggett et al.,
supra note 26, at 768–79 (discussing application of equitable tolling doctrines to
IDEA and related policy issues).
95. D.K., 696 F.3d at 244–45; see also Brief and Appendix Volume I of Appellants at 23, D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2012) (No. 10-2189),
2011 WL 6800592 [hereinafter Brief for Appellants] (arguing behavioral plans
were “inadequately-developed”).
96. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 245, 247 (listing plaintiffs’ arguments under second
exception and noting school district did not provide documents until after parents
requested evaluation in January 2006); Brief for Appellants, supra note 95, at *24
(“[T]he District, in the face of [D.K.]’s well-documented educational needs . . .
failed to provide [the forms] until approximately January 8, 2006 . . . .”).
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Third Circuit Applies a Strict Standard97

Applying the standard set forth by several district courts, the Third
Circuit adopted the majority view that plaintiffs “must show that the school
intentionally misled them or knowingly deceived them regarding their
child’s progress” to satisfy the first exception.98 Here, the first exception
did not apply because the record showed that the school initiated several
conferences with D.K.’s parents to notify them of his poor performance.99
Moreover, the school’s proposed solutions and suggestion of an evaluation
in the future did not constitute a misrepresentation with an intent to
deceive, but rather an intent to help D.K.100
Analyzing the second exception, the court relied on the statute’s
plain language and only examined whether the parents were denied any
statutorily required information.101 The plaintiffs argued the school’s failure to provide a permission to evaluate form and a procedural safeguards
notification until after their requested evaluation in January 2006 consti97. While this article discusses only the court’s application of the statute of
limitations exception, see D.K., 696 F.3d at 249–53 for the court’s analysis of the
alleged IDEA violations on the merits.
98. D.K., 696 F.3d at 246. “[T]he alleged misrepresentation . . . must be intentional or flagrant rather than merely a repetition of an aspect of the FAPE determination.” Id. at 245 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court distinguished inadequate evaluations from specific misrepresentations, stating, “Plaintiffs must establish not that the [school’s] evaluations of
the student’s eligibility under IDEA were objectively incorrect, but instead that the
[school] subjectively determined that the student was eligible for services under
IDEA but intentionally misrepresented this fact to the parents.” Id. (alterations in
original) (citations omitted). Thus, D.K.’s parents could not successfully argue
that a faulty evaluation in April 2006, or a failure to evaluate prior to that time, was
equivalent to the school subjectively determining D.K. was disabled but misrepresenting that information to the parents. See id. (describing difference between parents’ argument and standard).
Moreover, the court reiterated the legislators’ preference to leave such determinations to the discretion of the hearing officer. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (describing statute’s deference to hearing officers and refusal to define
“misrepresentation”). Therefore, while required to delineate the scope of the exceptions, the court owed significant deference to the hearing officers. See id. Such
decisions are only reviewed for clear error. See supra note 92 (describing standard
of review at judicial level).
99. See D.K., 696 F.3d. at 247 (noting numerous conferences held with D.K.’s
parents “specifically aimed” to address D.K.’s issues, implying school’s desire to
involve parents rather than intention to deceive or mislead).
100. See id. (noting school district merely proposed solutions, but did not confidently express such solutions would resolve D.K.’s issues). The court also reasoned that because the behavioral plans did yield some improvement and the
results of those plans were accurately reported to D.K.’s parents, no intentional
misrepresentation could be established. See id. Thus, the court construed the exceptions to apply when the school’s conduct works against the progress of the
child rather than to advance the child’s education. See id. (implying intent to help
D.K.). For further discussion of the court’s multi-factor test, see infra notes 111–13
and accompanying text.
101. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 246–48 (describing statutory language as requiring
“little elaboration”).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014

R

17

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-5\VLR504.txt

unknown

Seq: 18

15-OCT-13

12:25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 5 [2014], Art. 4

860

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58: p. 843

tuted an impermissible withholding of information.102 However, the
school was not required by statute to provide such information prior to
that point.103
Finally, the court added that even if the two exceptions did apply, the
parents could not establish the school district’s conduct caused their failure to request the due process hearing within the two-year period.104 The
evidence of D.K.’s parents’ request for an evaluation showed they knew of
their right to an evaluation.105 The court established that where “parents
were already fully aware of their procedural options, they cannot excuse a
late filing by pointing to the school’s failure to formally notify them of
those safeguards.”106
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: THE IMPACT OF D.K. V. ABINGTON SCHOOL
DISTRICT ON PRACTITIONERS, POLICY, AND PARENTS
Prior to D.K. v. Abington School District, no circuit court had interpreted the exceptions to the statute of limitations so explicitly.107 The
Third Circuit’s decision is thus beneficial to practitioners because it clarifies some prior inconsistencies amongst the district courts.108 However,
the decision established a stringent test, which will have the practical effect
of limiting the number of cases in which parents may successfully toll the
statute of limitations.109
102. See id. at 247 (describing plaintiffs’ claim against school district under
second exception).
103. See id. (noting limited circumstances in which information is required);
supra note 63 and accompanying text (listing when parents are entitled to
information).
104. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 247–48 (finding school’s conduct, even if sufficient
under either exception, did not cause parents to delay hearing request).
105. See id. at 248 (noting fact of parents’ “unprompted” evaluation request
indicates knowledge of IDEA procedures and rights). Moreover, even if the parents were not independently aware of their right to an evaluation, the fact that
D.K.’s teachers suggested an evaluation as a future option imputes knowledge to
the parents of that right. See id. (imputing knowledge of right to parents). Therefore, the parents could not claim that their lack of knowledge of the right to an
evaluation caused their failure to request a hearing sooner. See id. (refusing to
allow parents’ purported ignorance of evaluation right to satisfy causation
requirement).
106. Id. at 246–47; accord S.H. ex rel. A.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 487 F.
App’x 850, 862–63 (5th Cir. 2012).
107. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 245 (“[T]he scope of these exceptions is an issue of
first impression for United States Courts of Appeals.”); Gerl, supra note 16 (noting
Third Circuit is first to address exceptions to statute of limitations, making D.K.
case “a big deal”).
108. See Parents Ability to Extend the Two-Year Statute of Limitations Under the IDEA
Has Now Been Significantly Limited by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, FOX ROTHSCHILD EDUCATION ALERT (Oct. 2012), http://www.foxrothschild.com/newspubs/
newspubsArticle.aspx?id=15032387446 (noting significant litigation surrounding
exceptions since statute of limitations added to IDEA in 2004).
109. See id. (noting parents will have great difficulty establishing that exception to statute of limitations should apply in future cases).
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A “Highly Factual Inquiry”: Deconstructing the Third Circuit’s Approach110

To invoke the first exception under this strict test, parents will first
have to show that the school was aware of the extent of the disability or the
adequacy of the proposed solutions.111 Next, the school must have actual
knowledge that its representations of the student’s progress or disability are
untrue or inconsistent with the school’s own assessments.112 The court’s
use of “inconsistent” is vague and undefined, thus leaving room to dispute
any discrepancies found between the school’s knowledge and the information communicated to parents.113
The Third Circuit indicated that circumstances showing the school
intended to help the student’s progress promote a finding that the school
did not knowingly misrepresent information.114 For instance, the court
highlighted the fact that the school district conducted several conferences
with D.K.’s parents intending to notify them about their son’s poor performance.115 Also, the parents were kept apprised of all improvements
and challenges throughout his schooling, and the district sought parental
permission and input at every step.116 Considered as a whole, the circumstances imply the school wanted to help D.K., not hinder his progress.117
The court did not, however, indicate which facts, if changed, could
yield an alternative result.118 For example, it is unclear whether the court
placed much weight on whether additional conferences were routine procedure for the school district, or if extra conferences show an additional
110. See supra text accompanying note 57 (describing analysis as “highly
factual inquiry”).
111. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 247 (noting this actual knowledge is required to
show intentional misrepresentation). If the basis of parents’ claim is a faulty evaluation that did not reveal a disability, the school district could not logically know
the extent of the disability. See id. (finding no misrepresentation where school did
not know D.K. had ADHD prior to November 2007). Further, parents could not
show the school had knowledge of the adequacy of the behavioral programs. See
id.
112. See id. at 246 (reasoning that requiring actual knowledge of inconsistencies between representations to parents and actual evaluations best represents language and intent of IDEA provisions, rather than mere negligence).
113. See Inconsistent Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/inconsistent (last visited July 13, 2013) (defining inconsistent as “lacking consistency” and including synonyms such as “disagreeing,” “discrepant,” and “inharmonious”).
114. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 247 (outlining facts contributing to finding that no
misrepresentation made to D.K.’s parents).
115. See id. (noting teachers’ detailed descriptions of D.K.’s “misconduct, frustration, challenges, and development” to parents).
116. See id. at 240–42 (outlining parental involvement and communication
during early education years).
117. See id. at 247 (noting these facts “fall well short” of type of misrepresentation required to toll statute of limitations under first exception).
118. See id. (discussing facts in their entirety to support conclusion, but not
indicating which facts were most persuasive or compelling).
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effort to get the parents involved.119 Thus, litigants should closely scrutinize the information disclosed in conferences as compared to other facts
or circumstances known to the school that could show a disability, but
were not communicated to the parents.120 Any inconsistencies could arguably support a misrepresentation claim.121
Further, the school district’s expressed confidence to parents that
proposed solutions would be effective helps plaintiffs invoke the first exception.122 In D.K., the school district proposed solutions but never expressed any confidence in the effectiveness of the solutions, although they
did yield some improvement.123 The Third Circuit placed significant
weight on the district’s silence regarding the plans’ efficacy, and it further
implied that expressing confidence in the effectiveness of programs that
do not yield favorable results would more likely be a misrepresentation
than no expression of confidence at all.124
The most compelling fact is likely whether the school district suggests
an evaluation might be necessary down the road.125 The Third Circuit
placed great emphasis on the fact that D.K.’s teachers suggested a future
evaluation to impute knowledge to D.K.’s parents of their right to an evaluation.126 This suggests that if the teachers did not recommend a future
evaluation, the parents would not have known of their right to the evaluation, thus defeating the rationale used in the Third Circuit’s causation
analysis.127 Moreover, if the district recommended an evaluation and the
119. See id. (discussing conferences).
120. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text (discussing court’s vague
use of “inconsistent” to compare information in determining misrepresentations).
121. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 246 (noting school’s knowledge of inconsistencies is
required).
122. See id. at 247 (“The School District proposed solutions, but it did not
imply, let alone state with any confidence, that these measures would succeed or
eliminate the eventual need for an evaluation.”). Thus, if the school did imply the
measures would succeed, the balance might have tipped towards a misrepresentation. See id. (using school’s level of confidence in proposed solution as factor in
determining whether school made misrepresentation). However, stating with confidence would presumably be even more persuasive. See id.
123. See id. (noting behavioral plans did help D.K. improve and school district
reported favorable results to parents).
124. See id. (using effectiveness of behavioral plans as evidence that even if
teachers implied or expressed confidence in plans, no inconsistencies between
teachers’ expressions and actual results justify finding misrepresentation).
125. See id. (noting evaluation suggestion is relevant to both misrepresentation and causation analyses).
126. See id. (using evaluation suggestion as support for conclusion that no
misrepresentation occurred). While not necessarily dispositive, the fact of the suggestion indicates the teachers were unaware of an actual disability because no formal evaluation or diagnosis occurred and the teachers were not intending to
communicate to the parents that they had resolved the issue, but rather they were
unsure whether an issue even existed. See id.
127. See id. (noting parents’ knowledge of right to evaluation implied school
district’s failure to notify could not have caused parents’ delay in requesting due
process hearing).
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parents decided to request the evaluation immediately, they would have
been entitled to a procedural safeguards notification explaining the timelines for challenging the district’s decisions.128 Then, the parents would
have known of the two-year timeline and would have been able to file a
timely hearing request.129
B.

Consistent with Congressional Intent and Public Policy

While the statute of limitations is a tough hurdle to overcome, the
Third Circuit’s approach is consistent with Congress’s intent in adding the
statute of limitations in 2004 and with the general purpose of all statutes of
limitations.130 First, Congress sought to motivate parents to be involved
with their child’s education, and Congress’s imposition of a statute of limitations forces parents to stay involved and resolve issues quickly.131 Moreover, the longer a child remains in an ill-suited educational environment,
the more the purpose of the statute is evaded.132 By setting a two-year
limit, Congress envisioned quicker resolution of these issues so that children, the ultimate beneficiaries of the IDEA, would be placed in suitable
programs.133 The Third Circuit’s approach reinforces this deadline, decreasing the number of cases falling under an exception and furthering
congressional intent.134
128. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (describing three circumstances in which parents are entitled to procedural safeguards notification).
129. See, e.g., D.G. v. Somerset Hills Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 484, 492
(D.N.J. 2008) (suggesting information about timelines would have helped parents
file timely request); Ravenswood City Sch. Dist. v. J.S., 870 F. Supp. 2d 780, 788–89
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (same).
130. See Daggett et al., supra note 26, at 768–69 (outlining Congress’s intent
and purpose for adding uniform statute of limitations); see also supra note 52 and
accompanying text for a discussion of congressional intent behind the IDEA limitations period.
131. See Daggett et al., supra note 26, at 769 (discussing Congress’s desire for
IDEA disputes to be resolved more promptly than other federal litigation).
132. See id. (noting short deadline best serves primary goal of IDEA to provide
eligible students with appropriate programs as quickly as possible). Moreover,
Congress’s strong emphasis on the parental role under the IDEA is intended to
ensure each student eligible under the IDEA receives the most effective educational program possible. See id. at 728 (noting consistency between congressional
intent and imposition of limitations period). Requiring parents to request the
hearing in a short amount of time ensures students are placed into the appropriate
special education programs as quickly as possible because it is typically the parents
requesting the hearing. See id.
133. See id. at 769 (“This choice of fairly short time periods suggests that Congress thought that prompt resolution of IDEA disputes best served the IDEA’s primary goal of providing eligible students with appropriate educational
programs . . . .”); see also supra note 52 (addressing counterarguments and
problems with shorter deadline).
134. See generally D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2012)
(tightening standards for exceptions to IDEA, thus limiting cases in which exceptions apply).
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Second, statutes of limitations are intended to weigh the balance between protecting the interests of individuals bringing the claims and the
courts’ interests in avoiding stale cases.135 Thus, the Third Circuit’s decision respects that while parents of disabled children should have their day
in court, they must do so within a limited time to avoid burdening courts
with overdue cases where relevant evidence may be difficult or even impossible to find.136 However, courts should still consider “whether congressional purpose is effectuated by tolling the statute of limitations in given
circumstances.”137
C.

Parents Face Higher Burdens, Students Face Harsh Results

The Third Circuit’s interpretation also places a very high burden of
responsibility on the parents.138 It requires parents to be aware of their
rights and responsibilities from the very beginning and quickly file a hearing request at the first sign of any IDEA violation.139 The rule makes two
critical assumptions.140 First, it assumes parents have sufficient knowledge
of the IDEA to be able to recognize a violation.141 Second, it assumes
135. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463–64 (1975) (“[Statutes of limitations] reflect[ ] a value judgment concerning the point at which the
interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in
prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.”).
136. See Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (“[Statutes of
limitations] promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims
that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”).
137. Id. at 427 (noting congressional intent is indicated by “the purposes and
policies underlying the limitation provision, the Act itself, and the remedial
scheme developed for the enforcement of the rights given by the Act”).
138. See supra notes 45–49 (discussing active parent role envisioned by
Congress).
139. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C) (2006) (requiring parents to request hearing within two years of date parents knew or should have known about action forming basis of complaint). If D.K.’s parents requested the due process hearing at the
first sign of a violation, the court would have evaluated the school district’s conduct on the merits of the IDEA claims in the two-year period immediately preceding the date the parents requested the hearing. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 244–48
(discussing time period reviewable by court). However, this assumes the parents
would recognize a potential violation and know of their right to request a hearing.
Cf. id. (imputing knowledge of right to evaluation to parents where teacher mentioned future evaluation).
140. See Phillips, supra note 9, at 1823–36 (discussing IDEA’s “dangerous
assumptions”).
141. See id. at 1829–32 (discussing parents’ lack of knowledge about educational options and disabilities); Stanley S. Herr, Special Educational Law and Children
with Reading and Other Disabilities, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 337, 374 (1999) (noting special
education requires complex and specialized training and services, making few parents competent to effectively advocate for their children); Kotler, supra note 48, at
372–73 (noting many parents are unaware how quickly their children should be
progressing academically, which inhibits their ability to recognize problems).
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parents recognizing a violation would know of their right to a due process
hearing or other remedies.142
The parental burden will have a harsh impact on students without
involved or informed parents.143 While D.K.’s parents were fortunate
enough to hire private therapists, many families without means will not
have the same advantages.144 Moreover, many families go through the
process of filing IDEA claims without a lawyer.145 As a result, they are
unable to establish their case, nonetheless meet their burden of proof to
overcome the statute of limitations.146 Thus, perhaps the Third Circuit
has pushed the statute’s purpose too far—giving parents too much credit
and assuming parents are more involved and informed than practically
possible.147
142. See David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Education
Rights and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 179 (1991) (discussing
parents’ lack of knowledge about children’s substantive educational rights). Parental participation in children’s education seems to be the exception, not the
rule. See id.; see also Buss, supra note 10, at 648 (“[N]ot all parents are this competent and self-sacrificing.”); Phillips, supra note 9, at 1823 (noting parents rarely
request due process hearings).
143. See generally Hyman et al., supra note 8 (discussing how parents without
access to lawyers and advocates will be most harmed by statute requiring active
parental involvement). Low-income, poorly educated parents will be most affected, as research shows few school districts comply with the requirement that
procedural safeguards notices be issued in easy-to-read language that may be understood by persons without a college education. See id. at 132 (citations omitted).
However, placing the burden on parents is consistent with Congress’s findings
about effectiveness of parental involvement. See supra note 47 and accompanying
text (discussing congressional findings regarding parents).
144. See Hyman et al., supra note 8, at 144 (noting low income families cannot
pay experts or afford services to establish records necessary to win on IDEA claim
at judicial level).
145. See M. Brendhan Flynn, In Defense of Maroni: Why Parents Should Be Allowed to Proceed Pro Se in IDEA Cases, 80 IND. L.J. 881, 881 (2005) (“Should the ability
to pay for the services of an attorney determine which students have a better
chance of receiving [a FAPE] because they can afford an attorney . . . ? I think we
would all agree that the answer to that question is a resounding ‘no.’ ”); Hyman et
al., supra note 8, at 113 (“Access to attorneys in the special education realm is
relatively rare.”). The national special education bar is small, comprised mainly of
solo practitioners and small firms. See id. at 113 n.22.
146. See Hyman et al., supra note 8, at 144 (“Those families cannot pay experts, will not have access to IEEs, and cannot afford to purchase the services on an
up-front basis to establish a record of progress and success.”); see also R.B. ex rel.
F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 942–43 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting
that expert testimony of persons who frequently interact with student, such as physicians and other service providers, help establish plaintiffs’ case); Pachl v.
Seagren, 453 F.3d 1064, 1067, 1072–73 (8th Cir. 2006) (illustrating how parents
frequently introduce testimony of educational experts to establish case).
147. See Phillips, supra note 9, at 1827–28 (discussing obstacles to effective
parental advocacy). The IDEA presumes that parents are both capable of and willing to advocate for children. See id. However, many parents are reluctant to challenge school officials, who are presumed to have greater knowledge of educational
programs and effectiveness. See id.; see also Herr, supra note 141, at 366
(“[P]arental participation is often limited because of excessive parental deference
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Competing Purposes

The Third Circuit’s approach to the statute of limitations renders the
IDEA’s available remedies virtually unattainable to well-deserving students
like D.K.148 Courts fear that interpreting the exceptions broadly will make
the statute of limitations practically meaningless.149 However, interpreting the exceptions so narrowly arguably limits the IDEA’s ability to achieve
its very purpose—to effectively educate children with disabilities by
promptly placing them in appropriate special education programs.150
For example, the equitable remedy of compensatory education is triggered when a school knew or should have known a student was receiving
an inappropriate education.151 Unfortunately, when the statute of limitations interferes—when the parents request a due process hearing more
than two years after the denial of a FAPE—this remedy is unavailable because the denial of a FAPE alone is insufficient to toll the statute of limitations under either exception.152 Thus, where a school should have
known—or even did in fact know—about a student’s disability, the IDEA
affords no relief absent a showing of a knowing misrepresentation or withholding of required information.153
Consequently, a school could prevent plaintiffs from successfully asserting the first exception merely by performing minimal evaluations.154
to professional educational judgment . . . .”); Kotler, supra note 48, at 361 (“[T]he
belief that educators have superior knowledge . . . may lead to deference [by parents] to their decisions.”). Parents are also hesitant to advocate for their child’s
FAPE for “fear of retaliation against the student; a desire to maintain good relations with the school; cultural norms that place educators in positions of unquestioned authority; feelings of shame about having a child with a disability; and a
sense of powerlessness.” Hyman et al., supra note 8, at 135 n.150 (citations
omitted).
148. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 248–53 (3d Cir. 2012) (precluding award of compensatory education because conduct within two year limitations period did not constitute IDEA violation).
149. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ fear of
broad exceptions swallowing rule).
150. See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text (discussing purposes and
development of IDEA).
151. See Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 873 (3d Cir. 1990)
(“[C]ompensatory education . . . cures the deprivation of a handicapped child’s
statutory rights . . . .”); Perry A. Zirkel, Commentary, Compensatory Education Services
Under the IDEA: An Annotated Update, 190 EDUC. L. REP. 745, 745 (defining compensatory education as “in-kind special education and other related services for denials of a [FAPE]”); see also P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585
F.3d 727, 739 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing circumstances allowing compensatory education remedy).
152. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (noting courts’ refusal to allow
IDEA claim itself to overcome statute of limitations).
153. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 251 n.6 (noting that conduct occurring outside of
two-year limitations period is not even considered in determining IDEA violations
and therefore, no remedy is available as long as limitations period applies).
154. See, e.g., J.S. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 826 F. Supp. 2d 635, 661
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (recognizing Child Find does not require formal evaluation of
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Basic evaluations may not reveal any disability at all, which precludes a
plaintiff from arguing that the school knowingly misrepresented information about the disability.155 Granted, this argument assumes the school
would take advantage of parents’ tendency to request due process hearings more than two years after the alleged IDEA violation occurred.156
Conversely, if the parents filed within the two-year timeline, the school
might face a tougher challenge.157
V.

CONCLUSION

The importance of education in our society is undeniable.158 The
Supreme Court recognized that “[a]n educated populace is essential to
the political and economic health of any community, and a state’s efforts
to assist parents in meeting the rising cost of educational expenses plainly
serves this secular purpose of ensuring that the state’s citizenry is welleducated.”159 Therefore, in assessing the Third Circuit’s interpretation of
the statute of limitations’ exceptions, it is important to consider which interests should prevail under the circumstances: the legislature’s interest in
providing a free public education for disabled children, or the courts’ interest in excluding stale claims?160
While credible arguments can be made for each side, the Third Circuit’s test remains.161 Future litigants should take care to closely scrutinize the facts of the case, focusing especially on any inconsistencies that
every struggling student); A.P. ex rel. Powers v. Woodstock Bd. of Educ., 572 F.
Supp. 2d 221, 226 (D. Conn. 2008) (noting failure to diagnose struggling students
at earliest moment is not always actionable given difficulty of diagnosing disabilities and experts’ competing definitions of disabilities).
155. See P.P., 585 F.3d at 738–39 (noting while evaluations should be tailored
to student’s specific problems, evaluations need not identify and diagnose every
possible disability). But see G.D. ex rel. G.D. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 832 F. Supp.
2d 455, 465–67 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (noting evaluation of student with significant behavioral problems overemphasized student’s academic success, giving insufficient
weight to behavioral problems, rendering testing inadequate and insufficient to
satisfy Child Find obligations).
156. See supra notes 142–46 (discussing typical barriers to parental action).
157. See, e.g., P.P., 585 F.3d at 739 (analyzing award of compensatory education where parents filed within statutorily required timeline). Because the parents
did not have to bear the burden of proving that exceptions to statute of limitations
applied, the court thus placed more emphasis on whether the school provided
appropriate education to the student in compliance with IDEA principles. See id.
158. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (highlighting education’s
importance).
159. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983).
160. Compare supra notes 130–37 (describing Congress’s purpose in establishing statute of limitations period in IDEA and purposes of limitations periods in
general), with supra notes 36–49 (describing purpose of IDEA to protect rights of
disabled students). But see Daggett et al., supra note 26, at 739 n.129 (noting IDEA
encourages settlements, which are resolved more quickly, but also sometimes result in less than full FAPE for children).
161. See supra notes 97–106 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit’s interpretation of statute of limitations exceptions under IDEA).
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may be highlighted to support a finding that the school misrepresented
information to the plaintiffs.162 Further, to effectively advocate for their
clients, attorneys specializing in education law should make an effort to
disseminate knowledge of the rules, to inform parents of their rights, and
encourage prompt filing of complaints.163
Moving forward, litigation of similar issues will likely arise in neighboring circuits.164 For the sake of disabled children, it is essential to raise
awareness of these issues and promote solutions to benefit these students.165 After all, “no greater benefit can be bestowed upon a long benighted people than giving to them . . . the means of useful education.”166
162. See supra notes 110–29 and accompanying text (explaining factual
analysis).
163. See supra notes 141–47 and accompanying text (discussing parents’ lack
of knowledge as barrier to effective advocacy and prompt resolution of claims
within two-year timeline).
164. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting
Third Circuit was first to address scope of limitations exceptions, but also discussing inconsistent cases in other circuits).
165. See Hyman et al., supra note 8, at 145–61 (proposing solutions for families without means); Phillips, supra note 9, at 1837–51 (proposing statutory revisions and supplemental programs).
166. Frederick Douglass, Blessings of Liberty and Education (Sept. 3, 1894),
available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/blessings-ofliberty-and-education.
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